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SEEKING TRUE FINANCIAL REFORM: ENDING THE
DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
ABSTRACT
This Note identifies the failure of Congress to address tax incentives
for leverage as a principal cause of the recent financial crisis and a fundamental flaw of recent financial reform legislation. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code provides substantially disparate tax treatment for
debt and equity financing by allowing firms to deduct interest payments on
indebtedness, but not providing an equivalent deduction for equity funding. This “debt-equity distinction” artificially reduces the cost of capital
for debt financing relative to equity financing and encourages firms to
over-employ leverage in their capital structure. This in turn increases
financial distress costs and externalities to the economy and increases the
volatility of capital markets. Though some scholars have proposed to
allow firms a deduction for dividends paid, such a scheme would create
additional distortions and introduce the potential for corporate managers
to substantially manipulate their taxable income. This Note offers an alternative solution by proposing: (1) that the deduction for interest on
business indebtedness be eliminated, and (2) that policymakers return to
the idea of the Cost-of-Capital-Allowance (COCA). A COCA deduction
better aligns the incentives of firms with those of capital markets and
economies writ large, and encourages managers to seek out the absolute
cheapest sources of capital while removing tax shelter considerations
from the decision-making process.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 2008, J.P. Morgan made an emergency purchase of the
entire firm of Bear Stearns for $2 a share, although the price had once
been as high as $211 a share.1 Bear Stearns had been operating with a
leverage ratio of 30:1, forcing the Federal Reserve to back the purchase in
an attempt to stave off a broader financial market collapse.2 On September
14, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy protection
after several failed attempts to find a buyer.3 The firm employed a controversial accounting technique known as “Repo 105” to trim $50 billion in
liabilities from its balance sheet in the months leading up to the bankruptcy filing, artificially lowering the amount of leverage reported to investors.4 That same week, Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch in a
“shotgun” deal arranged with government assistance, and AIG received a
huge infusion of federal government cash valued at $85 billion.5 Both
companies also maintained large leverage ratios whereby relatively small
amounts of equity capital supported vast quantities of financial assets.6
This Note proposes a method that would limit the necessity of such
drastic actions by removing the tax incentives of firms to engage in overleveraging. All the firms described in the preceding paragraph collapsed in
part due to skyrocketing leverage ratios and undertaking vast amounts of
debt to finance their operations. When asset valuations fell below the
amount of their liabilities, lenders and trading parties began to doubt
whether these firms could cover their obligations and began a flight to
liquidity.7 Traders began short-selling their stock, investors attempted to
liquidate positions, and lenders issued margin calls on their loans in a
frenzied attempt to recover their capital.8 The margin calls forced these
firms to liquidate their own positions at fire-sale prices, incurring losses of
1

KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE
TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 211 (2009). J.P. Morgan later raised the purchase
price to $10 a share in March 2008 due to shareholder pressure. Id. at 225–26.
2
Id. at 11, 210.
3
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill Is Sold; Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman Set to File
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1.
4
See Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Brothers Hid Borrowing, Examiner Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1.
5
Eric Dash, Purchase of Merrill Fulfills Quest for a Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2008, at A18; see also KELLY, supra note 1, at 219; Sorkin, supra note 3.
6
See KELLY, supra note 1, at 11, 217, 219.
7
Id. at 217–19; see also Sorkin, supra note 3.
8
See SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE RISE
OF A NEW ELITE 179 (2010).
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increasing magnitude.9 Heavy reliance on leverage increases the amount
of assets that must be sold as the firms require increasing amounts of capital to meet the margin calls.10
During the first half of the Obama administration, policymakers,
scarred by the public reaction to bailouts and loan guarantees, focused on
crafting a new regulatory framework to prevent the need for such an
overwhelming federal response in the future. On July 15, 2010, Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, granting regulators more
powers to regulate risky financial practices on Wall Street and imposing
costly new reporting requirements on capital market participants.11 Notable provisions include: (1) the Volcker Rule, which mandates that regulators set guidelines limiting the amount of capital that banks can risk in
proprietary trading and investments with private equity and hedge funds;
(2) guidelines dictating the regulators’ ability to break up dangerously
large financial firms as a last resort before allowing markets to collapse;
and (3) a last-resort clause allowing regulators to impose emergency 15:1
leverage ratios on specific financial firms if necessary to prevent “grave
threat[s] to the financial system.”12
With respect to preventing future meltdowns, Dodd-Frank relied heavily on granting greater power to regulators to prohibit high-risk financial
practices; however, the legislation did not alter the incentives that originally encouraged firms to engage in such practices. Financial reform that
targets such incentives should focus primarily on the tax deduction for
interest on business indebtedness. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) allows businesses and individuals to deduct all interest payments “paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness,”13 as long
as such interest payments relate to business activities.14 The deduction
9

Id.
Id.
11
Brady Dennis, Senate Passes Landmark Bill in Triumph for Obama, WASH. POST,
July 16, 2010, at A1.
12
U.S. SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 4–5 (2010), available at http://bank
ing.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_
summary_Final.pdf [hereinafter DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM]. Due to space
constraints, this Note will only touch briefly on a few aspects of the Dodd-Frank reform
bill.
13
I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006).
14
Id. § 163(h) (disallowing deductions for all interest payments on personal indebtedness for individuals). A major exception to this rule is interest on a mortgage or home
equity loan related to an individual taxpayer’s personal residence, which is fully deductible. Id. § 163(h)(3).
10
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reduces the effective after-tax cost of employing leverage (indebtedness)
in the capital structure of a firm.15 Moreover, the IRC contains no equivalent deduction for employing equity capital, which raises the cost of equity
relative to debt financing.16 IRC Section 311(a) disallows any deduction
for corporate distributions of property, generally known as dividends, and
the corporation receives no beneficial tax treatment from the dilution of
ownership interest that occurs with equity fundraising.17 This difference in
tax treatment is commonly known as the “debt-equity distinction,” and is
widely believed to create distortions in capital markets that lead to negative economic consequences.18
This Note argues that Congress committed a potentially serious error
in its attempt to prevent future financial panics by failing to directly address the debt-equity distinction. The deduction for business interest
should be disallowed and replaced with a Cost-of-Capital-Allowance
(COCA) deduction that makes no distinction between debt and equity at
the level of the corporate entity.19 Through this tax reform, the extreme
difference in tax treatment between debt and equity disappears, and the
incentives of corporate managers evolve to pursue means of financing that
carry the lowest absolute cost of capital, thus removing tax considerations
from the decision-making process.
Part I will discuss the tax treatment of leverage and equity at both the
entity level and the investor level. Part II will analyze the impact of leverage on the economy at both the micro and macro levels, illustrating how
the financial activities of one firm can send shockwaves throughout the
entire economy. Part III will briefly describe recent attempts and proposals
15
See Adam O. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 131 (1985) (noting that a firm
can reduce its after-tax cost of capital if it succeeds in re-characterizing equity as debt).
16
See id. at 118 (explaining that this disparate treatment of debt and equity is wellsettled in tax law, though it lacks a clear rationale).
17
See I.R.C. § 311(a). Corporations must recognize gain and pay tax on appreciated
property distributed as dividends, though again no loss may be recognized on the distribution of depreciated property. Id. § 311(b).
18
See Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV.
1217, 1222 (2010) (noting the debt-equity distinction “aggravated the recessionary impact of the financial meltdown on the real economy because firms operating with low
equity cushions are very dependent on their ongoing access to credit”); Katherine Pratt,
The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1056
(2000) (“This Article discusses the time-honored but outdated tax law distinction between corporate debt and equity. Economists and legal commentators and the Treasury
Department have made various proposals to eliminate the debt-equity distinction.”).
19
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1139–45 (describing the COCA proposal).
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for reform of financial practices, including Dodd-Frank and other proposals from legal scholars. Part IV will put forth the main thesis of ending the
deduction for interest payments, with an emphasis on designing the tax
code changes to promote economic growth. The conclusion will list concrete steps to be taken over the next couple of years to achieve the best
possible outcome.
In advancing its thesis, this Note will operate under two analytical
frameworks designed to improve the final proposal and broaden its appeal.
First, any changes to the tax code should be designed to promote, not
hinder, long-term economic growth. The tax code contains several distortions, and simply removing one distortion will not improve economic
efficiency if tax reform is designed improperly and other distortions
arise.20 In a 2004 law review article,21 Peter Orszag and William Gale
listed several guidelines that tax reform plans should follow to promote
growth: (1) the change must be either revenue-neutral or be contemporaneously matched with corresponding spending changes; (2) the change
must be designed to encourage new economic activity, not to reward existing activity; and (3) the change should reduce resources directed towards
tax avoidance.22 This Note will aim to follow these guidelines elsewhere
described as the theory of the “second-best”23and strive to account for
additional distortions in the IRC while devising a solution for the debtequity distinction.24
Second, this Note will operate within the framework of agency theory
and the modern corporation. Specifically, this Note will acknowledge the
divergence in economic interests between the shareholders and managers
of a firm when discussing a firm’s decision-making process.25 This theory
20

See id. at 1056 (“The theory of the second-best posits that eliminating an economic
distortion does not necessarily increase efficiency if other economic distortions remain.”).
21
William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the
Bush Administration, 2001–2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157 (2004).
22
See id. at 1192–94. See generally Paul Sullivan, Confusion over the Dormant Estate
Tax Keeps Advisers Busy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at B6 (describing the efforts of
wealthy individual taxpayers to take advantage of the one-year absence of the estate tax
in 2010).
23
See Edward J. McCaffrey, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807,
849–50 (2005) (“Tax, because of its incentive effects and the limited information of
government policymakers—not to mention administrative concerns—is in a deeply
‘second-best’ situation. There is simply no a priori way to say that welfare would improve [by substantially altering the tax code].”) (emphasis added).
24
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1056.
25
See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980) (“Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems
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is relevant due to the different impact the debt-equity distinction has on
both shareholders and corporate managers. Therefore, an optimal solution
to this tax distortion must account for the divergence in economic interests
between shareholders and managers to be successful.26
I. TAX TREATMENT OF DEBT AND EQUITY
The tax treatment of debt and equity financing instruments is complex,
and for corporations this treatment varies significantly depending on
whether the shareholder or the corporate entity is considered. This section
describes the taxation of each form of financing in the context of corporate
double taxation, first at the corporate entity level and then at the investor
level.
A. Treatment at the Entity Level
The debt-equity distinction is most apparent at the entity level of taxation. IRC Section 163(a) allows businesses to deduct interest payments on
indebtedness, regardless of whether the interest is related to short-term
financing of current operations or the long-term financing of capital
projects and expansion.27 This deduction is taken against both ordinary
and capital gain income for corporations,28 and the amount of interest that
may be deducted per tax year is limited only through the net operating loss
provisions in IRC Section 172.29 Given the corporate marginal tax rate of
35%,30 this deduction effectively reduces a firm’s cost of capital on debt
financing by over one-third. Corporations use this tax shield heavily to
increase after-tax net income; a Department of Commerce report con-

that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the
firm’s security holders.”).
26
See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B.
27
See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006).
28
See id. § 1211(a) (applying capital loss limitations only on losses due to sales or
exchanges of capital assets).
29
Both corporate and individual taxpayers may carry a net operating loss in the current tax year back two years to wipe out previous tax liabilities. If any current losses
remain, they may be carried forward to offset tax liabilities for the next twenty years until
exhaustion. See id. § 172.
30
Id. § 11(b). Corporations pay a marginal tax of 34% on all income between $75,000
and $10,000,000, with all excess income taxed at a 35% rate. Personal service corporations pay a tax of 35% on all income earned in the tax year. Id. § 11(b)(2).
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cluded that corporations deducted $2.085 trillion in interest payments in
2007.31
Financing operations with equity, however, does not provide corporations with a corresponding tax deduction for their cost of capital. IRC
Section 311(a) disallows corporations from recognizing any losses or
deductions on the distribution of dividends or the repurchase of stock.32
Thus, if a corporation raises $100 of equity capital and pays out $10 in
dividends each year, the after-tax cost of the dividends is the full $10. If
the corporation raises the same $100 in bonds at a 10% interest rate, the
corporation still owes $10 in interest payments each year. The corporation
can reduce its taxable income by the same $10, however, and therefore
reduce its tax liability. The after-tax cost of the interest payment is thus
only $6.50, given a 35% marginal corporate tax rate.
The stark contrast in tax treatment of debt and equity at the corporate
level encourages firms to attempt to construct transactions that exhibit the
form of debt financing but contain the substance of equity financing.33
Debt financing brings better tax treatment, but equity financing potentially
carries fewer restrictions on the flexibility of corporate managers;34 an
instrument that combines both of these qualities is thus highly valuable.
Though IRC Section 385(a) authorizes regulations to clarify this issue of
“line-drawing,”35 the Treasury Department has so far left responsibility for
deciding close calls to the judiciary.36
B. Treatment at the Holder Level
Taxation of debt and equity instruments at the investor level partially
offsets the distortion at the entity level;37 however, the taxation of instru31

U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 496
tbl.753 (130th ed. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ta
bles/12s0753.pdf.
32
I.R.C. § 311(a).
33
See Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1221–22.
34
See generally Pratt, supra note 18, at 1061–64 (providing an overview of the different tax treatments and benefits of debt and equity financing).
35
I.R.C. § 385(a); see also Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1222.
36
See Benshalom, supra note 18, at 1235. Section 385(b) provides courts with five
factors to consider when determining whether an instrument is equity or debt: (1) written,
unconditional promises to repay; (2) any subordination or preference to the indebtedness
of the firm; (3) the leverage ratio of the firm; (4) convertibility from debt to stock; and (5)
the relationship between bondholders and shareholders of the firm. I.R.C. § 385(b).
37
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1090 (“[T]he corporate level tax advantages of using
debt in the capital structure are offset to some degree because of investor level tax consequences.”).
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ment-holders carries less weight in the capital structure decision-making
process for corporate managers than the taxation of the corporate entity.38
Bondholders are taxed at the generally higher marginal rates of ordinary
income for interest received;39 currently, the highest marginal rate on
ordinary income for individuals is 35%.40 Bonds may be bought and sold
for purposes of speculation, however, and any gain on such sales can be
classified and taxed as a capital gain to the extent the gain is not due to
original issue discount.41
Conversely, shareholders currently receive favorable tax treatment on
their instruments relative to ordinary income. Most individual shareholdertaxpayers pay a low 15% marginal rate on dividends received as a result of
the Bush-era tax cuts passed in 2003.42 Furthermore, individual shareholders pay the same low rate of 15% on capital gains on most equity instruments held for more than one year.43 Losses on the sale of equity instruments, regardless of how long the taxpayer held the instrument, can offset
short-term capital gain, long-term capital gain, and $3,000 of ordinary

38

See id. at 1092–93 (“Even in light of all of the potential offsets to the tax advantages of corporate debt, the consensus view of economists is that corporate debt is significantly tax favored over corporate equity.”).
39
I.R.C. § 64 (defining ordinary income as all income which is not the result of a sale
or exchange of capital property as defined in Section 1231(b)).
40
Id. § 1. This marginal rate for individuals in the highest tax bracket is set to persist
through 2012 as a result of a December 2010 tax compromise between Republicans in
Congress and President Obama. See Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama Salutes Spirit of Compromise, Signs Tax Bill, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/tax
es/articles/2010/12/17/obama_salutes_spirit_of_compromise_signs_tax_bill/.
41
I.R.C. § 1271 (requiring amounts received in retirement of the bond’s principal or
in exchange for the right to receive the bond’s principal to be classified as a capital exchange); Id. § 1272 (excluding gains attributable to original issue discount from the
definition of a capital exchange).
42
Id. § 1(h)(11). This tax rate is set to continue through 2012, again as a result of the
December 2010 tax compromise between congressional Republicans and President Obama. See Kuhnhenn, supra note 40. Tax-exempt entities pay no tax on dividends received
from equity investments, whereas corporations may take advantage of a dividendsreceived deduction to eliminate any tax liability arising from the receipt of dividends
themselves. See Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double
Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2009) (citing I.R.C. § 243 (West 2008)).
43
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2006). The marginal tax rate for gains on the sale of equity securities held for less than one year is the ordinary income tax rate of the taxpayer. Id.
§ 1222(11). If the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate for ordinary income is 15% or less, the
taxpayer enjoys a 0% tax rate on capital gains income. Id. § 1(h)(1)(B).
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income per tax year.44 The shareholder can carry forward any unused
losses to future tax years until exhaustion.45
One may reasonably assume that the favorable tax treatment of equity
at the shareholder level compensates for the reverse treatment at the entity
level. The interests of the managers running the firm diverge from those of
shareholders, however, and therefore shareholder taxation is likely a relatively minor consideration of corporate managers when making financing
decisions.46 Scholar Michael Doran has argued that corporate shareholders
support tax changes that “increase the value of existing capital,” whereas
corporate managers prefer to lower the tax burden on new investment.47
Moreover, managers can persuade shareholders that increased leverage
will provide a higher valuation of the firm than will equity financing due
to the tax shield, and this higher valuation will increase the value of the
investors’ holdings.48 Therefore, the distinction in taxation at the entity
level likely carries significantly more weight in the capital structure decision-making process.
II. IMPACT OF LEVERAGING
A firm’s strategy in building its capital structure and financing operations can have a tremendous impact on the success of the firm, both in the
short- and long-term. This section describes a few consequences of capital
structure strategies, beginning with an extremely basic overview of the
44

Id. § 1211(b).
Id. § 1212(b).
46
See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (noting that whereas shareholders desire cash
payouts from the firm, managers desire to grow the resources of the firm, leading to
common clashes of interest).
47
Doran, supra note 42, at 532–33. Doran made these observations in the course of
advancing his argument that, though shareholders support corporate tax integration,
corporate managers are at best ambivalent and possibly even against full integration
despite the likelihood of overall welfare benefits to the economy. See id. at 528–34 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS
INCOME ONCE (1992)). An additional analogy to illustrate this divergence is found in the
different tax consequences of a property tax versus an income tax. Shareholders would
prefer lower property taxes, because that reduces the tax burden on their existing capital;
managers would prefer lower income taxes to increase the gains to their future projects.
48
See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction
Discourages Innovation and Risk Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1469, 1481–82 (1993)
(“[C]orporations trying to maximize their value will choose a capital structure that minimizes total taxes ....”).
45
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analytical framework for judging a firm’s capital structure decisions. The
section then notes a few of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of
leverage, both on a micro- and macro-economic scale.
A. Capital Structure of a Firm
Firms generally finance their activities with a combination of equity
and debt, with the optimal structure constituting the formula that meets all
financing needs with the lowest possible cost of capital.49 The ModiglianiMiller Theorem, famous in the field of corporate finance, held that given a
tax-free environment, the exact mix of debt and equity is irrelevant to a
firm’s valuation.50 Taxes do impact the market, however, and debt receives a tax shield from the deductibility of interest payments.51 Thus, the
value of a leveraged firm is equal to the value of the firm unleveraged plus
the tax shield the firm receives from leverage.52 Therefore, assuming no
marginal change in interest payments, a firm’s optimal capital structure
may theoretically be all debt and no equity, because as leverage increases,
so does the tax deduction.53
Such a heavy reliance on leverage has drawbacks, especially in the
form of financial distress costs. These costs include bankruptcy costs,
higher costs of raising new debt, and higher transaction costs in normal
business operations.54 Lenders require higher interest rates in return for the
risk inherent in lending to an already highly-leveraged firm.55 Additionally, due to provisions in the tax code limiting the ability of corporations to
take advantage of the full amount of operating losses in a single tax year,56
the value of the interest payment tax shield is limited to the extent of the
firm’s annual pre-tax net income. Many scholars have thus observed the
49

Id. at 1467 (“Choosing the capital structure that minimizes the corporation’s cost of
capital is desirable because it maximizes the value of the corporation.”).
50
See Anne P. Villamil, The Modigliani-Miller Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~avil
lami/course-files/PalgraveRev_ModiglianiMiller_Villamil.pdf.
51
I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006).
52
See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1050–53
(1998) (describing the “irrelevance theorem” put forth by Franco Modigliani and Merton
Miller).
53
Id.
54
See generally id. at 1061–62 (listing several costs of financial instability that may
result from a firm’s heavy reliance on leverage in its financial structure).
55
Villamil, supra note 50, at 3.
56
See I.R.C. § 172 (2006) (describing the carry-back and carry-forward limitations on
net operating losses).
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interest deduction tax shield has a declining marginal value as the leverage
of a firm increases.57
A more advanced version of the Miller-Modigliani Model accounts for
these financial distress costs, though firms do not fully internalize some of
these losses.58 The new model subtracts the costs from the value of a leveraged firm; otherwise equal to the value of the firm unleveraged plus the
tax shield from debt.59 Some forms of financial distress costs, such as
costs from bankruptcy, can be devastating to the firm and possibly end the
life of the corporation.60 Due to the limited liability of the shareholders
and management of a corporation, however, corporate managers have
reduced incentives to caution against high-risk projects disproportionately
financed with debt.61 Moreover, the phenomenon of “too-big-to-fail” firms
presents problems of moral hazard, encouraging managers to act overaggressively with the knowledge that a significant share of any resulting
losses will be passed on to the taxpaying public.62
B. Benefits of Debt
Debt offers benefits to individual firms through avenues other than the
tax code. Increasing leverage to raise overall after-tax net income improves several key financial metrics that stock analysts and investors often
scrutinize, a move that favors existing shareholders and managers. Return
on equity (ROE), an important financial metric for equity shareholders,

57

Knoll, supra note 48, at 1473–75.
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1089 (“The failing businesses’ failures to make interest
payments may cause a domino effect in the economy, as creditors of the failing businesses in turn find themselves unable to service their debt.”). See generally Knoll, supra note
48, at 1475–77 (observing a firm’s financial distress imposes indirect costs on employees,
suppliers, and customers).
59
See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 1061–69.
60
See Knoll, supra note 48, at 1475–81 (describing the direct and indirect costs of
bankruptcy).
61
See id. at 1478–79.
62
See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Exchequer
Club in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/speech/tarullo20091021a.htm (“The management and shareholders of the too-big-to-fail
institution ... may thus be motivated to take greater risks with the cheaper funds.... If the
risky projects pay off, the shareholders profit famously. If the results are bad, the government may keep the institution afloat, thereby preserving at least some value for shareholders.”).
58
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measures the proportion of a firm’s net income relative to its total equity.63
The ratio can increase sharply as a result of a corporation selling bonds to
finance profitable expansion, as the numerator of net income increases
while the denominator of total equity remains constant. The same effect is
present in the financial metric of earnings-per-share (EPS), which divides
net income by outstanding shares of common stock.64 Financing profitable
expansion with debt increases EPS more than if both equity and debt financing are employed equally in the baseline capital structure, as debt
financing alone does not change the denominator of outstanding shares of
common stock.
Additionally, shareholders may prefer debt because of the restrictions
and oversight that loan covenants place on firm managers.65 Raising capital through equity offerings carries few restrictions on the flexibility of
corporate managers, increasing their ability to manipulate the financial
indicators of the firm to their advantage.66 Inherent to bond offerings,
however, is a promise to pay out interest payments in a specified amount
on a certain date.67 The mandate to pay out interest and eventually repay
the principal motivates managers and employees to ensure operations
perform at a level sufficient to meet these obligations.68 Additionally, loan
agreements with large banks often include requirements and covenants as
a condition of lending to the firm.69 These characteristics allow debt to
reduce agency costs in the shareholder-manager relationship, providing

63
See generally Anthony Currie & Peter Thal Larsen, Morgan Stanley Makes
Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at B2 (illustrating the importance of return on
equity to investment bank analysts).
64
See generally Bloomberg News, Forecast-Beating Profits Sustain a Market Rally,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2011, at B7 (noting 72% of S&P 500 companies reporting earnings
in January and February 2010 beat EPS forecasts).
65
See Jensen, supra note 46, at 324.
66
Id. (“Managers with substantial free cash flow can increase dividends or repurchase
stock and thereby pay out current cash that would otherwise be invested in low-return
projects or wasted.”). The author does note reductions in the expected dividend payment
are often penalized through reductions in the share price of the firm. Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board
Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 560 (2010) (“These contracts, however, can and
often do grant creditors the right to veto fundamental corporate transactions, receive
financial information, observe board meetings, and appoint one or more directors or
convert the debt into equity under certain circumstances.”).
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managers with more incentive to act in the best interests of the shareholders of the firm.70
A final benefit of the effective use of leverage is the potential to substantially increase gains from trading and speculation. Author and journalist Sebastian Mallaby describes how early hedge funds in the 1950s–60s
employed leverage to gain a sizable advantage over more risk-averse investors.71 Mallaby cites an example of a sophisticated speculator practicing certain hedging techniques who borrows an amount equal to his original pool of capital.72 Through leverage, the investor further diversifies his
portfolio, and thus both decreases net exposure to the market and increases
overall profitability.73
Another example of leverage increasing rates of return can be found in
the housing market prior to the recent recession. A “Seeking Alpha” article provides an example of an individual purchasing a home for
$100,000.74 One option is for the individual to buy the home entirely with
his own capital; if the home appreciates $10,000 in value, the purchaser
has experienced a 10% rate of return.75 If the individual instead puts down
only $10,000 of his own capital and borrows the remaining $90,000 at 6%
interest, he is leveraged 10:1 and must pay $5,400 in interest in the current
year.76 If the house experiences the same $10,000 appreciation in value,
however, the purchaser has now experienced a 65% rate of return: the
$10,000 appreciation divided by the sum of the $10,000 down payment
and the $5,400 interest payment.77 Of course, a movement in price in the
opposite direction has the reverse effect of wiping out the entirety of the
taxpayer’s equity and placing the house on the verge of going underwater.

70

See Jensen, supra note 46, at 324 (“Thus debt reduces the agency costs of free cash
flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.”).
71
MALLABY, supra note 8, at 23–28.
72
Id. at 24–28.
73
Id. at 24–25. Mallaby’s example imagines a traditional investor with $100,000, investing $80,000 in stocks and $20,000 in safe government bonds. A leveraged investor
practicing hedging techniques borrows another $100,000, increases his long investment
in stocks to $130,000, and exchanges his safe bonds for a short position in stocks worth
$70,000. The leveraged investor has thus reduced his net exposure to the market from
$80,000 to $60,000 while increasing his overall positions.
74
Andy Singh, Leverage 101: The Real Cause of the Financial Crisis, SEEKING
ALPHA (Sept. 25, 2008), http://seekingalpha.com/article/97299-leverage-101-the-real-cau
se-of-the-financial-crisis.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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Finally, Mallaby describes the story of the 1990s hedge fund Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM).78 LTCM, a firm founded by former
Salomon Brothers vice chairman John Meriwether, employed advanced
financial engineering techniques to greatly enhance profits on minimal
amounts of equity.79 The firm employed complex “value-at-risk” calculations to gauge potential losses, and built an incredibly diversified portfolio
of uncorrelated trades and positions to substantially minimize risk—at
least in theory.80 Though the firm achieved a mere 2.45% return on total
assets in 1995, through leverage this number transformed into a 42.8%
return on contributed equity.81 This formula worked wonderfully for the
hedge fund for several years; however, as this Note describes below, dual
financial crises in East Asia and Russia in 1998 exposed the extreme vulnerability of high leverage and caused LTCM to blow up.82
C. The Danger of Debt
The downside to these methods is that fantastic success through leverage quickly becomes a colossal failure if either asset prices fall or the risk
managers leave a variable out of their calculations. Ezra Klein, in a 2010
blog post for the Washington Post, captured the vulnerability of leverage
to falling prices through a graph comparing leverage ratios to the propensity of a firm to go underwater.83 For a firm without any leverage, only a
complete loss of value in all assets will sink the firm.84 This results from
pursuing a strategy of full capitalization and not investing beyond its
means. A firm with a leverage ratio of 2:1, financing half of its investments with borrowed funds, requires a 50% drop in asset values to go
underwater.85 This process of leverage increasing volatility continues to
grow until a firm leveraged 40:1, right above the level of Bear Stearns
immediately before its collapse, requires a drop in asset values of only
2.5% to have its entire original investment wiped out.86

78

MALLABY, supra note 8, at 221–44.
Id. at 221–22.
80
Id. at 227–28.
81
Id. at 227.
82
Id. at 233–42.
83
Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 20, 2010, 11:33 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/ezra-klein/2010/04/explaining_financial_regulation.html.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
79
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Both falling asset values and incomplete risk modeling contributed to
the swift fall of LTCM. In May 1998, the firm began to experience setbacks due to the market volatility arising out of financial crises in Indonesia, Japan, and Russia.87 In the span of one week in the middle of August,
LTCM lost 15% of its capital: $550 million.88 LTCM reacted with hurried
attempts to raise money, but the sales pitches only panicked other market
participants even more, which in turn cost the fund more capital.89 LTCM
then received margin calls from lenders seeking payment of interest, principal, and posting of extra collateral; this forced the fund to dump assets at
fire-sale prices, leading to further drops in asset values.90 The downward
spiral continued until most of the major investment banks on Wall Street
stepped in with an industry bailout to prevent the panic from spreading,
foreshadowing the government bailout ten years later.91
Encouraging debt over equity has consequences other than increased
volatility. The distinction also shifts investment capital away from innovative, high-risk startup companies and towards relatively safer and more
stable firms in established industries.92 Michael Knoll, Co-Director of the
Center for Tax Law and Policy at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School,93 points out that high-risk startup firms have less capacity for
leverage in their capital structure because they do not have a consistent
earnings history or steady cash flow.94 More established companies are in
better positions to employ the interest deduction in devising their capital
structure, substantially lowering their cost of capital.95 The overall cost of
capital of a firm can act as a “hurdle rate” for judging new ventures and
projects; managers and investors will pursue only those projects with an
expected rate of return above the cost of capital.96 The interest deduction
thus encourages greater investment in stable firms past their rapid growth
period, increasing competition for startups in acquiring capital.

87

MALLABY, supra note 8, at 233–34.
Id. at 234.
89
Id. at 235–36.
90
Id. at 236.
91
Id. at 244.
92
Knoll, supra note 48, at 1465–66 (“Thus, traditional technologies and industries are
encouraged at the expense of emerging technologies, new production methods and hightech industries.”).
93
Michael Knoll, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL: FACULTY, http://
www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mknoll/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
94
Knoll, supra note 48, at 1486–88.
95
Id. at 1488–89.
96
Id.
88
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This distinction between high and low debt capacity firms causes several distortions in the broader economy. The first and most obvious distortion is slower rates of innovation and development of new technologies
and products.97 Second, the deduction distorts markets through the encouragement of inefficient mergers between firms that separately have volatile cash flows.98 Mergers between firms with uncorrelated earnings cycles
can increase diversification and reduce volatility in future cash flows,
allowing for higher debt capacity.99 This higher debt capacity allows the
merged firm to utilize the interest deduction tax shield on a greater
scale.100 Mergers have high failure rates, however, as many combinations
do not produce higher shareholder value or increase rates of return.101 The
interest deduction therefore encourages more mergers than are efficient by
providing for the potential of greater tax savings.102
Finally, the tax shield for leverage distorts the economy through slower rates of job creation. A recent 2010 study by economists John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda argues that the common claim
from politicians that “small businesses” are the primary engine of job
growth is misleading.103 The study found a relatively small causal relationship between the small size of a firm and net job growth rates.104 Rather, the authors determined that the more robust and disproportionate
engines of job growth are young startup firms, despite their small share of
the overall U.S. labor market.105 Though young firms also have high rates
97

Id. at 1492–95. Knoll observes that these high-risk, high-reward assets are more
likely to be intangible and created as the result of long R&D processes requiring steady
investment. Id. at 1495.
98
Id. at 1493.
99
See Knoll, supra note 48, at 1493.
100
Id. at 1466.
101
See Kevin Voigt, Mergers Fail More Often than Marriages, CNN: WORLD
BUSINESS (May 22, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/05/21/merger.mar
riage/index.html. A 2004 study by consulting firm Bain & Company found that 70% of
mergers did not realize an increase in value to shareholders. Id.
102
Knoll, supra note 48, at 1493–94 (“Thus, the corporate interest deduction encourages inefficient conglomerate mergers. This reduces national income.”).
103
John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, & Javier Miranda, Who Creates Jobs? Small
vs. Large vs. Young 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16300,
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16300 [hereinafter Who Creates Jobs].
104
Id. at 29. The authors conclude the “inverse relationship between [job] growth
rates and [firm] size remains but is not overwhelming.” The authors speculate part of the
cause behind the wide use of “small firm job creation” claims are “measurement issues”
in the most often used data set, which “can lead to misleading inferences about the role of
firm size in job creation.” Id.
105
Id. at 30 (“Business startups account for roughly 3% of U.S. total employment in
any given year.”).
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of job destruction, successful small startups tend to have rapid growth
rates due to the “up-or-out” dynamic.106 Specifically, startup firms constitute 20% of gross job creation, which is more than six times their proportion of the overall employment market at 3%.107 In contrast, older and
larger firms constitute 40% of job creation, but this number is less than
their overall share of the labor market, which is around 45%.108
Young, dynamic startup firms with a disproportionate contribution to
job creation rates in the United States are precisely the firms harmed
through the investment distortion arising out of the interest deduction.
These firms produce jobs both through the original startup process and, for
those lucky few startups that achieve success, the rapid growth trajectory
to mature firm status.109 Startups are much more likely to have low or
nonexistent capacities for debt early in their life cycle,110 and therefore
they cannot take full advantage of the easy tax shield inherent in the interest deduction.111 Therefore, the interest deduction of the tax code slows
job growth by directing investment away from those firms most likely to
rapidly increase employment.112
106

Id. at 29–31.
Id. at 31.
108
See Who Creates Jobs, supra note 103, at 30–31. The authors define older, larger
firms as being in business for longer than ten years and employing more than 500 workers. Id.
109
Id. at 25 (describing the “up-or-out” dynamic among young, high-risk startup
firms).
110
Knoll, supra note 48, at 1486–95.
111
See id. at 1496.
112
Innovative, technology-based companies often receive other tax benefits that, in
some cases, more than compensate for the disadvantage inherent in their capital structure.
Recent newspaper and magazine articles have pointed out that companies in the biotechnology, drug, and internet industries pay the lowest marginal corporate tax rate in the
U.S. as a whole, with the capital-intensive utility and oil industries at the other end of the
spectrum. Reasons cited for the disparity include tax breaks for research and development
spending, as well as favorable tax rates on income earned overseas. See David Leonhardt,
The Paradox of Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, at B1 (noting the United
States imposes one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world, yet collects a relatively
small percentage of overall revenue through the tax); Derek Thompson, Who “Wins”
Under Our Bizarre and Complicated Corporate Tax System?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY
(Jan. 28, 2011, 12:52 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/01/who
-wins-under-our-bizarre-and-complicated-corporate-tax-system/70428/ (“Companies with
high R&D spending or a large overseas presence pay very little, and companies that do
business mostly inside the U.S. pay very high.”). A possible argument in support of the
distortion in favor of established companies is that young startup firms have high failure
rates and thus lead to job destruction, in addition to robust job creation. This characteristic of young startup firms plays a valuable role in our economy, however, allowing human and physical capital to move from inefficient products and firms to more efficient
107
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III. RECENT ATTEMPTS AT FINANCIAL REFORM
The federal government has been tremendously active in recent years
regarding matters of financial regulation and banking oversight. Further,
legal scholars have proposed several additional measures to address the
debt-equity distinction. As will be discussed below, however, these proposals do not adequately address the incentives behind the dangerous
financial practices that caused the recent financial panic. A brief discussion of these proposals will help illuminate the case for substituting the
interest deduction with a COCA deduction.
A. Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill
The Dodd-Frank bill aimed to prevent, among other things, several of
the problems common to over-leveraged companies discussed above.113
The comprehensive legislation contains several major provisions dealing
with disparate aspects of the financial system, ranging from consumer
credit practices to shareholder input on executive pay to limits on banks
investing with hedge funds.114 As mentioned in the introduction, the bill
further provides federal regulators with several powers of last resort, including the imposition of a strict leverage ratio cap and the ability to break
up firms posing systemic risk to the financial system.115 The “Volcker
Rule,” limiting proprietary trading, has angered investment banks which
had previously wildly profited from the activity.116 Additionally, the new
consumer financial regulations have raised the ire of credit card companies
and consumer mortgage lenders.117
firms. This process, often called “creative destruction,” increases economic output and
raises the standard of living for the average individual. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the
Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of
Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 861 (2005) (“These
newly created ventures must be more innovative and productive than their already established competitors in order to compete, which has the added benefit of forcing the established competitors to improve.” (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950))).
113
See DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12.
114
Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 11.
115
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12, at 4.
116
See Floyd Norris, Volcker Rule May Work, Even if Vague, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2011, at B1 (“[Bankers] had hoped for clear rules that could be complied with—or
evaded, if you want to be cynical.”).
117
See Damian Paletta, Fight over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is Signed,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, at A1 (“The new consumer regulator will be funded by the
Federal Reserve and have independent powers to write and enforce rules governing how
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More relevant to this Note, however, are provisions giving Federal Reserve regulators the discretionary power to impose a 15:1 hard leverage
cap on financial firms conclusively judged to be a grave threat to the
health of the financial system.118 Several policymakers argued that giving
experienced regulators the discretion to impose this relatively stringent
leverage ratio will be an effective tool in preventing future financial panics.119 As journalist Sebastian Mallaby points out, however, the traditional
leverage ratio is a blunt metric with several failings.120 First, the ratio
“fail(s) to account for swaps and options,” financial instruments that
played a substantial role in the financial crisis.121 Second, the ratio fails “to
distinguish between hedged bets and unhedged ones,” though the former
pose relatively little risk to the health of a firm if structured properly.122
Finally, the ratio compares only total assets to capital—not potential losses
to capital—though the latter ratio is more indicative of a firm’s threat to
the financial system.123
As a last resort against a meltdown, Dodd-Frank may ultimately be a
tremendous improvement from the regulatory apparatus in place before
the recent financial crisis. However, as a means of preventing the need for
such a strong government response in the future, Dodd-Frank does little to
alter the incentives for large banking firms to pursue risky capital structure
and financing strategies.
The bill employs strict regulation of the financial and investment practices of banking and investing institutions.124 Nonetheless, the prospect of
large profits remains on the other side of the new regulations. Thus, financial firms will have strong incentives to water down the new rules through
lobbying and complex legal, accounting, and financial methods designed
loans and other financial products are offered, bearing on everything from the type of
mortgages people can get to the fees on their credit cards.”).
118
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12, at 4.
119
See Dennis, supra note 11.
120
MALLABY, supra note 8, at 228.
121
Id. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 29 (2010). Lewis describes a
credit default swap as essentially “an insurance policy” on a bond, whereby the buyer of
the swap receives a payout from the seller exponentially higher than the purchase price if
the bond issuer defaults. At its peak, AIG had insured approximately $50 billion worth of
credit default swaps on consumer loan securities, 95% of which constituted subprime
mortgages. Id. at 90.
122
MALLABY, supra note 8, at 228.
123
Id. Mallaby notes LTCM employed a metric that accounted for some of these disadvantages in the 1990s. Id.
124
See DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM, supra note 12, at 4–5, 8 (recommending stricter regulations for “capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management and other requirements”).
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to give the appearance of compliance. Additionally, the question of
whether market conditions have sufficiently deteriorated to warrant imposing the tough new measures may not be anything more than a judgment
call,125 and banking executives are certain to exert some influence over
this decision.
B. Dividend Deduction Proposal
Some scholars have recently renewed a proposal for allowing corporations a deduction for dividends paid to mirror the interest payment deduction.126 The argument for a dividend deduction is similar to that of the
dividend tax cut contained within the tax cut legislation of 2003.127 Both
approaches attempt to mitigate the debt-equity distinction through reducing the relative tax burden on equity financing while leaving the interest
deduction untouched.128 The dividend tax cut falls on the shareholder level
of the corporate double tax, whereas the dividend deduction affects the
taxation of the corporate entity.129 An advantage of the dividend deduction
is that it avoids the problem of agency through targeting managerial decision-making directly.130 On the other hand, the dividend deduction retains
many problems of the dividend tax cut, and adds significant, unique disadvantages that make the proposal more problematic than removal of the
interest deduction.131
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Amir C. Chenchinski argue for a dividend deduction primarily to integrate the corporate and individual tax systems,132
but they cite mitigating the debt-equity distinction as a secondary bene125
See Financial Reform in America: A Decent Start, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16481494.
126
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH & AMIR C. CHENCHINSKI, CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION
AND THE DEBT/EQUITY DISTINCTION: THE CASE FOR DIVIDEND DEDUCTION 4 (2010),
available at https://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.downloa
d&file_id=55888.
127
See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, H.R. 2, 108th Cong.
§ 301(a)-(c) (2003). The legislation reduced the maximum capital gains rate to 15% and
moved most dividends into the capital gains category.
128
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1133–35.
129
See id. at 1133.
130
See AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 126, at 8 (describing how the dividend deduction automatically affects both managers and shareholders).
131
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1134–35 (outlining several drawbacks to a corporate
level dividend deduction, including loss of tax revenue, increasing net operating loss
distortions, and inverting the debt-equity bias towards equity).
132
See AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 126, at 4 (“The right form of integration, we would argue, is dividend deduction.”).
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fit.133 These scholars argue that a dividend deduction achieves the desired
result of reducing the tax bias against corporations,134 but that it is designed more narrowly than similar proposals.135 This is because the deduction directly affects only management behavior with no impact on the
taxation of shareholders.136 Further, they argue that the dividend deduction
fully addresses the inherent bias of corporate managers towards retaining
earnings to increase share price, whereas other proposals only partially
compensate for this bias at best.137 Finally, they state that the proposal will
create “true debt/equity parity” without disallowing a deduction for interest expense, which they claim is “a legitimate cost of doing business.”138
Regarding the bias towards retention, the dividend deduction will be
problematic regardless of whether the proposal achieves the intended
effect. On one hand, the proposal may suffer from pitfalls that scholars
identified with the 2003 dividend tax cut and not generate enough new
activity.139 Steven Bank and Katherine Pratt argue separately that the large
increase in dividends immediately after passage of the 2003 tax cut140 was
likely a result of the temporary nature of the change; under the 2003 legislation, tax rates on dividends were scheduled to increase back to their
previous levels in 2011.141 Companies distributed record amounts of dividends to shareholders to take advantage of a temporary decrease in tax
rates, but did not make fundamental changes in dividend policy.142 A permanent change in the tax treatment of dividends would not strongly impact the dividend policy of corporations, as the tax code would not provide
a “limited time only” windfall on which firms could capitalize.143 There-

133

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 9.
135
The authors compare a dividend deduction against proposals for a comprehensive
business income tax and exemption of dividends received at the holder-level. Id. at 8–10.
136
Id. at 8.
137
Id. at 9 (“The bias against retention is only partially addressed by dividend exemption and imputation, because distribution decisions are taken by managers who may not
care very much about the shareholder tax.”).
138
See AVI-YONAH & CHENCHINSKI, supra note 126, at 10.
139
See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 533, 536 (2007); Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as
the Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 533 (2007).
140
Bank, supra note 139, at 534. S&P 500 companies paid out a record $202 billion
in dividends in 2005, followed by another predicted $225 billion in 2006. Id.
141
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, H.R. 2, 108th Cong.
§ 303 (2003).
142
Bank, supra note 139, at 557–58.
143
Id.
134
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fore, a temporary dividend deduction would mitigate the retained earnings
bias only to a limited extent.
Conversely, if the dividend deduction does permanently alter the dividend policies of firms, this will result in a huge windfall for existing
shareholders. This conflicts with several of the tenets put forth by Gale
and Orszag regarding designing tax changes to encourage economic
growth.144 Large shareholders would enjoy great increases in dividends
despite not altering their economic behavior from before the tax change.145
Gale and Orzsag argue this windfall will lower the increase in efficiency
arising as a result of the tax change, especially when coupled with the
increase in government interest costs arising from the additional deficit
financing.146
The deficit plays an important role in another drawback of AviYonah’s proposal. The federal government would experience a potentially
significant loss of revenue if firms could deduct dividend payments;147 to
prevent increased deficits, Congress must enact corresponding spending
reductions and tax increases. If Congress follows the path of the 2003 tax
cut, long-term budget deficits for the federal government will increase
substantially.148 Pratt lists several costs associated with larger government
deficits, including: (1) crowding out of private investment, (2) higher
interest rates, and (3) diversion of government resources from programs
designed to support growth in favor of interest payments on the debt.149
Pratt has questioned whether increasing total dividends will generate
enough positive economic growth to overcome such heavy costs.150
144

Gale & Orszag, supra note 21, at 1192–94.
See generally Bank, supra note 139, at 557 (describing a commonly held view
among commentators that reducing taxation of equity via dividend policy “would be a
one-time windfall to existing investors”).
146
See Gale & Orszag, supra note 21, at 1194–96 (stating an increase in government
deficits “will reduce income and raise interest rates significantly in that year and future
years and hence will make the environment for long-term growth more difficult”).
147
S&P 500 firms paid out $202 billion in dividends in 2005 and were expected to
pay out another $225 billion in 2006. See Bank, supra note 139, at 534. Assuming a 35%
corporate tax rate, allowing a dividend deduction would result in a $70.7 billion revenue
loss in 2005 and a $78.75 billion revenue loss in 2006 for the federal government from
S&P 500 firms alone.
148
See Pratt, supra note 139, at 539 (noting that Congress financed the 2003 dividend
tax cut entirely through deficit financing).
149
Id. at 540. Pratt also cites increased dependence on foreign investors as another
cost of government borrowing. Id.
150
Id. at 543 (“Economists have concluded the 2003 dividend tax cut could promote
long-term growth only if it were not deficit-financed.”). Pratt would also include another
requirement for tax cuts to meet before they are judged to be economically beneficial.
145
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Finally, the dividend deduction has one significant problem that it does
not share with a dividend tax cut. Allowing a deduction for dividends
provides managers a tool to substantially manipulate tax liabilities through
increased or decreased distributions. A firm’s dividend policy may have
no rational connection to the firm’s overall performance during the year in
terms of gross income and ability to pay a dividend.151 Because the task of
setting dividend policy is generally within the exclusive control of management, managers can alter the amount of dividends paid to manipulate
the after-tax net income the firm reports to the IRS and to shareholders.152
This manipulation can partially mask a firm’s weaknesses, thereby both
reducing the incentives of managers to make substantive improvements to
the business and potentially misleading investors. Such potential consequences of tax liability manipulation weigh strongly against the implementation of the dividend deduction proposal.153
IV. DISALLOW THE DEDUCTION FOR BUSINESS INTEREST
A. Eliminating the Interest Deduction
The most direct path to both equalizing tax treatment of debt and equity and removing incentives for managers to over-leverage is to abolish the
corporate interest deduction. The decision of whether to finance operations
and expansion with equity or debt should be made pursuant to the business
nature of the undertaking, not the tax code. The reform of Section 163(a)
will place equity on equal terms with leverage regarding taxation of the
corporate entity through removal of the large tax shield associated with

The tax cut must “not increase the growing inequality in the United States.” Id. at 508. A
dividend deduction would be hard-pressed to meet this requirement, as Pratt’s calculations indicate that dividends “flow disproportionately to high-income taxpayers.” Id. at
551–52.
151
See Melly Alazraki, Dividend Hikes, Like Wal-Mart’s, Aren’t Always Great News
for Investors, DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/sto
ry/investing/wal-mart-raises-dividend-but-others-should-proceed-with-caution/1479871/
(noting forty companies in the S&P 500 increased dividends during the nadir of the
recent recession, compared with thirty companies that reduced dividends).
152
See Stephen A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1159, 1207 (2004) (explaining the strong opposition from corporate managers to
proposals designed to interfere with their decision-making regarding dividend policy).
153
See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1134, 1155 (arguing that two drawbacks of a dividend
deduction may be “reduced monitoring of corporate managers” and loss of tax revenue
for the government).
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leverage.154 Managers lose the tax incentive to increase leverage beyond
normal business considerations, and the continuing legal fight over how to
classify ambiguous “hybrid” instruments into certain categories mostly
comes to an end.155
One likely criticism of this proposal is Avi-Yonah’s statement that “interest is a legitimate cost of business,” and should therefore be deductible
from net income.156 Avi-Yonah singles out financial institutions in particular, arguing that to eliminate the interest deduction is to “effectively tax
them on gross interest income.”157 The question of the true nature of interest is more complicated, however, than Avi-Yonah’s statement suggests.
Interest payments are a cost of capital equivalent to dividend payments,
rather than an operating cost such as cost of goods sold, depreciation, or
overhead.158 The amount of interest paid is often more closely connected
to the financing arrangements the firm makes with lenders and bondholders, not the economic performance of the firm during a given period.159
The comparison is similar to the distinction between variable costs and
fixed capital costs: the former are deductible as they are incurred and/or
paid out, but the latter must be capitalized and deducted over the useful
life of the underlying asset.160 A deduction for interest, therefore, is not
necessary for the firm to obtain an accurate picture of net income.
The incurring of interest is thus a consequence of choosing to acquire
capital through leverage, and not necessarily a constant fact of life for an
ongoing business. This is not to argue that a firm should not be allowed a
154

See id. at 1136 (observing that eliminating the corporate interest deduction would
remove the “tax-advantaged” status of debt financing).
155
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§ 162(a) (2006).
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deduction for its cost of capital; the point, rather, is that IRC-granted deductions should not be based on the mere choice of one form of capital
over another, especially when the tax-favored choice can impose heavy
externalities on the broader economy.161 The interest deduction should
therefore be eliminated and replaced with a deduction that does not provide either method with an undue tax advantage.
B. The COCA Replacement
Allowing firms a fixed deduction for their cost of capital completes the
proposal for ending the debt-equity distinction. As suggested in the subsection above, merely repealing Section 163(a), thereby disallowing deductions for interest, may create another distortion as it corrects the distortion of encouraging over-leverage.162 One potential problem is that the
change is effectively a large tax increase on corporations at a moment
when the United States is attempting to improve its economic competitiveness in the global marketplace.163 Second, disallowing a deduction for
interest may swing the debt-equity pendulum too far in the other direction.
Differential tax treatment between debt and equity would remain for
shareholders in the form of lower tax rates on capital gains and dividends.164 This may over-encourage investment back towards startup corporations and firms with higher reliance on equity, generating a bubble
similar to the “dot-com” craze of the late 1990s.165
Encouraging heavier reliance on equity at the expense of leverage may
be beneficial for the economy. Shareholders may have incentives to be
more judicious regarding their investments, and equity does not have the
same potential for heavy social costs as debt. Regardless, firms should be
allowed some form of a deduction for their cost of capital to ensure their
taxable income reflects profits earned, and not absolute gross income.
Therefore, the interest deduction should be replaced with a COCA deduction applied to the entire capitalization of the corporation.166
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Under Pratt’s definition, the amount a firm may deduct as a COCA
equals a fixed percentage of the corporation’s “aggregate capitalization,”
including both equity and debt.167 Congress, possibly with the help of the
Treasury Department, will have the responsibility of setting the COCA
percentage, and can make further adjustments depending on the economic
situation and the market rate for capital. Thus, if a firm has $50 million of
capital including $20 million of equity and $30 million of debt, the
amount of interest the corporation pays on the debt is irrelevant for tax
purposes. However, if the fixed COCA percentage is 10%, the firm can
deduct $5 million ($50 million x 10%) from gross income as a COCA
deduction. This permitted deduction will stay constant if the firm converts
equity into debt and vice versa.
C. The Second-Best Justification
Substituting COCA for the interest deduction allows firms to continue
to deduct a significant portion of their cost of capital, yet removes the tax
incentives that encourage managers to over-leverage. Continuing the
theory of the second-best, other distortions remain in the form of beneficial tax treatment accorded to shareholders relative to bondholders.168 This
distinction at the holder-level may encourage managers to over-finance
with equity. Replacing the interest deduction with a COCA deduction
remains justified, however, for several reasons.
First, the lingering distinction for shareholders will likely cause less
distortion than the current tax treatment due to the divergence in economic
interests between shareholders and corporate managers.169 As mentioned
above,170 shareholders have the incentive to support tax reform that maximizes the value of their investments, whereas managers prefer a tax
reform that lowers the cost of new investments.171 Managers may consider
several other factors in a financing decision, including which method has a
lower overall cost of capital, before considering the tax treatment of investors.172 Therefore, the beneficial tax treatment of shareholders relative to
167
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bondholders alone will likely have a smaller distortionary impact than the
current distinction for the corporate entity.
Second, a distinction favoring equity is less likely to inflict heavy externalities on the broader economy than the current tax code. Both debt
and equity investments can be wiped out if the underlying asset goes under, representing a loss of capital to the economy. Shareholders do not
contribute equity to a corporation with the obligation that the firm repay
the funds on a specific date. Instead, shareholders receive ownership in the
firm as well as a right to receive any dividends that the firm pays out.173
The firm takes full possession of the equity proceeds to employ at their
discretion, reducing the risk that the firm will fail to meet its obligations
and descend into insolvency.174
Third, the proposal benefits innovative startup firms, which often must
rely more heavily on equity. As discussed above,175 innovative startup
firms with less predictable cash flows and higher proportions of intangible
assets have lower debt capacities than established firms with fungible,
tangible assets.176 Raising the cost of capital for leverage relative to equity
should encourage more investment in firms with heavier reliance on equity, which will benefit high-risk startup firms. Further, the recent Haltiwanger study discussed above177 indicates such firms contribute to job
growth rates disproportionately to their overall share of the private sector
labor market, as success at this early stage often brings rapid growth.178
Therefore, lowering the relative cost of equity could increase opportunities
for rapid job creation.
Fourth, allowing a deduction of only a fixed percentage of a firm’s
cost of capital may act as a soft cap on “too-big-to-fail” banks. The current
tax code allows firms to deduct the full amount of the increased interest
costs from high leverage, provided the firm has net income to offset. If the
tax advantages that the proposals may grant to the shareholders of those same corporations).
173
See generally David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the
New Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499, 500 (1994) (“Equity permits an investor to participate in corporate profits in exchange for assuming corporate risk. Debt, on
the other hand, permits an investor to avoid risk, in so far as that is possible, in exchange
for forgoing participation.”).
174
See generally Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 789–90 (2010).
175
See supra Part II.C.
176
Knoll, supra note 48, at 1486–88.
177
See supra Part II.C.
178
Who Creates Jobs, supra note 103, at 29–31 (describing the “up-or-out” dynamic
among young, high-risk startup firms).
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deduction is limited to a fixed percentage, managers will have no incentive
to push leverage beyond the point at which actual interest equals the fixed
percentage.179 Knoll writes that the optimal capital structure of a firm is
the point “when the additional tax shield benefits equal the additional
financial distress costs at the margin.”180 Capping the tax shield benefits
available to a firm lowers the optimal amount of leverage for the firm.
Therefore, firms will have less incentive to continue ever-greater expansion through leverage beyond the point at which their failure can be absorbed by natural market forces, reducing the likelihood of future government bailouts.
Finally, swapping a lopsided tax preference in favor of debt for a minor tax preference towards equity meets the criteria for promoting economic growth set forth by Gale and Orszag.181 The first criterion is that of
revenue-neutrality: tax reform should not increase the deficit so as to increase interest costs and crowd out private investment.182 The satisfaction
of this standard will be the responsibility of Congress upon setting the
fixed percentage of capital allowable to firms as a COCA deduction.
Second, Gale and Orszag advise that tax reform should encourage changes
in economic activity and not merely provide “windfall” benefits to taxpayers for engaging in activity that they would have undertaken regardless of
the change.183 This proposal encourages corporations to curtail funding
operations with high-interest leverage and to instead pursue financing with
the lowest absolute pre-tax cost of capital, including financial distress
costs. Equity funding will become more valuable relative to debt, encouraging new equity investment and satisfying the above second criteria.
The proposal meets the third and final criterion, as a fixed COCA deduction reduces the need for firms to direct substantial resources towards
tax avoidance.184 A firm may now deduct no more than a fixed, statutory
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percentage of its total capitalization as its COCA deduction.185 Increasing
the cost of capital beyond this percentage drains from the after-tax net
income of the firm and provides no extra tax shield. Therefore, firms have
an incentive to pursue financing solely on the basis of the lowest absolute
pre-tax cost of capital.
CONCLUSION
This proposal has the potential to have as dramatic an impact on capital markets as any provision in the recent Dodd-Frank financial reform
bill. Therefore, it is important for Congress to implement this proposal or
similar tax reform legislation gradually and incrementally. Immediately
disallowing a deduction for business interest could constitute a large hit on
the bottom line of many financial firms, possibly destabilizing capital
markets once again. Moreover, an immediate change may trigger a broad
deleveraging process in the corporate ranks similar to the trend among
American consumers over the past few years.186 Such deleveraging removes potential spending and investment from the national economy and
constitutes a drain on economic growth.187 Congress can mitigate these
possible effects by dragging out the implementation of the deduction
switch over multiple years and providing a roadmap to taxpayers at the
beginning of the process.
This Note does not argue that Dodd-Frank is inefficient and should be
repealed, nor does this Note support Dodd-Frank in all its manifestations.
Rather, this Note argues that recent financial reform is incomplete as long
as the incentives of corporations to engage in risky financial behavior do
not change. Replacing the business interest deduction with a COCA deduction represents a big step towards reducing the likelihood of a second
round of the expensive and morally troubling federal government interventions of 2008–2009 in the near future.
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